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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
To eliminate the confusion caused by the shifting roles of the parties in the pleadings and
for ease of understanding, the original Plaintiff and Appellant on appeal will hereinafter be
refen-ed to as "Mother" and the original Defendant and Respondent on appeal will hereinafter be
referred to as "Father."
On December 16, 2016, this case came before the Magistrate Court for a trial on Father's
Amended Verified Petition for Modification. This Petition sought to have child support set
within the Idaho guidelines, Father be granted substantially equal physical custody, and to
prevent the minor child from leaving with State of Idaho without the agreement of the patties or
court order.
After trial, the Magistrate Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order
(hereinafter "Decision") on January 6, 2017. R. pp. 128-136. This Decision set child support
within the guidelines and awarded primary physical custody to Father and visitation to Mother.
The Decision set forth, in detail, the facts upon which the Magistrate Court relied and the
findings from those facts.
Mother filed a Motion for Reconsideration requesting that the Magistrate Court
reconsider its order granting Father primary custody, as Mother reversed her sworn trial
statement that she was going to move to Virginia even if the B.G.S. was going to remain in
Shelly. Mother provided additional statements concerning the intelligence of B.G.S., the low
quality ofldaho Schools and the exceptional nature of Virginia schools. The Magistrate Court
held a hearing on the Motion to Reconsider and issued an Order denying the same.
Mother requested and was granted a direct appeal to this Court.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The patties were married on June 17, 2005 and had one minor child, B.G.S (born
as a result of the marriage. R. pp.14-15. The parties were divorced on September 25,
2007 pursuant to a stipulated settlement agreement. R. pp. 22-33. This agreement and order gave
Mother primary physical custody with Father receiving visitation on weekends and holidays. Id.
In January 3, 2012, Mother filed for a modification of the custody ofB.G.S., reducing the time
Father was allowed for visitation. R. pp. 34-51. The parties again stipulated to terms for a
modified custody order. The Court issued its Custody Modification Order on August 23, 2012.
R. pp. 54-71. Six days later, on August 29, 2012, Mother moved to Virginia with B.G.S. R. p. 82.
The move to Virginia created an extreme expense for Father to exercise his visitation.
Father filed a Petition for Modification on October 5, 2012. R. pp. 72-74. On April 26, 2013, the
Magistrate Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order on Father's Petition
for Modification. R. pp. 81-87. This Order granted Father visitation for the sll11Uller and spring
break with additional fall and holiday visitation. R. p. 84. This visitation schedule required
Father to fly to exercise the visitation. At the time, this visitation schedule worked, as Father was
employed in North Dakota and was earning a sizable income.
On May 21, 2015, Father filed a Verified Petition for Modification. R. pp. 91-93. The
Petition requested a modification of child support as Father was no longer working in Nmth
Dakota and had a greatly reduced income. Additionally, Mother had returned from Virginia with
B.G.S. to the Boise area. On July 15, 2016, Father mnended his Petition to include a revision of
the custody and visitation time. Trial was held on the Amended Verified Petition for
Modification on December 16, 2016.
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At trial, Father argued that his income had been greatly diminished and required an
adjustment to the child suppmt calculations and that B.G.S. should reside with him primarily and
have visitation with Mother. This request was made due to the fact that B.G.S. had been
repeatedly moved by the Mother, additional moves were anticipated, and B.G.S. had not been
able to remain at a single school.
At the time of trial, B.G.S. was 10 years old. Tr. p. 331. 2. Also at the time of trial,
B.G.S. was attending her fifth (5 th) school. Tr. p. 33-34. Mother also indicated that she had
changed residences five (5) times since the birth of B.G.S. Tr. p. 311. 10. Father testified that he
purchased his home in Shelly, Idaho in 2011 and had lived there ever since. Tr. p. 3911. 8-20.
Father testified that he wanted his daughter to go to a school consistently and be able to
build steady relationships with friends and family. Tr. pp. 47-48. Father testified that the
communication with Mother was very fiustrating, not consistent, and not good. Tr. pp. 50-51.
Father testified that after Mother's 2014 return to Idaho, he attempted to get additional time with
his daughter, but was not able to work that out with the Mother. Tr. pp. 69-71. Neither party was
willing to give on the time they were allowed with their daughter. Id. Father further testified that
the distance, difficult communication with Mother and consistency made it difficult to maintain a
relationship with his daughter. Tr. pp. 75-78.
Mother testified that she was currently living in Meridian, Idaho but had plans to relocate
to Virginia in August, 2017. Tr. pp. 28, 36. Mother testified that she would move to Virginia
even if the Court ordered B.G.S. to remain in Idaho. Tr. p. 116 IL 7-21. Mother testified that she
had an internship opportunity in Virginia and hoped it would turn into an actual position but was
not guaranteed. Tr. pp. 90, 108. Mother's main testimony concerning B.G.S. returning to
Virginia was the gifted and talented program for B.G.S.
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The parties also testified about the minor child's separation anxiety and autoimmune
disorder. The testimony was that she only saw a counselor for the anxiety and a pediatric
rheumatologist for the autoimmune disorder. Tr. pp. 109-110.

6

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Did the Magistrate err in Concluding that There Was a Material and Substantial
Change of Circumstances in its January 6, 2017 Decision and Reaffirming that
Decision in Its Order re Motion to Reconsider?

II.

Did the Magistrate Err in Concluding that it was in the Best Interests of the Minor
Child to Change Primary Custody in Its January 6, 2017 Decision and Reaffirming
that Decision in Its Order re Motion to Reconsider?

III.

Did the Magistrate Err in His Findings of Facts in Its January 6, 2017 Decision and in
Its Order re Motion to Reconsider?

IV.

ls Appellant Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal?
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Father hereby requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121;
Appellate Rules 40 and 41; and, all other applicable rules and statutes. I.C.§12-121 allows for
attorney fees when a case is brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. Mother in this matter has simply asked this Court to substitute its own findings for
that of the Magistrate Court. The Magistrate Court acted properly and within the bounds of its
discretion. Mother's claims are without me1it.
As such, Mother's request for attorney fees should be denied and fees granted for the
Father.
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ARGUMENT

I.

DID THE MAGISTRATE ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A

MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ITS JANUARY
6, 2017 DECISION AND REAFFIRMING THAT DECISION IN ITS ORDER RE
MOTION TO RECONSIDER?
On a permissive appeal under I.A.R. 12.1, the Court reviews the magistrate judge's
decision without the benefit of a district court appellate decision. Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho
401, 403, 64 P.3d 327, 329 (2003). A trial court's child custody decision will not be overturned
absent an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court does not abuse its discretion as long as the court
"recognizes the issue as one of discretion, acts within the outer limits of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and reaches its decision
through an exercise of reason." Id. When the trial court's decisions affect children, the best
interests of the child is the primary consideration. Id. at 403-04, 329-30.
"An abuse of discretion occurs when the evidence is insufficient
to support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and welfare
of the children would be best served by a particular custody award
or modification." Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713, 170 P.3d
375, 378 (2007). When reviewing the magistrate court's findings of
fact, this Court "will not set aside the findings on appeal unless
they are clearly erroneous such that they are not based upon
substantial and competent evidence." Id. Even if the evidence is
conflicting, findings of fact based on substantial evidence will not
be overturned on appeal. Id.
Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 318, 320-21, 281 P.3d 1096,
1098-99 (2012)
"Modification of child custody may be ordered only when there has been a material,
substantial and permanent change of circumstances indicating to the magistrate's satisfaction that
a modification would be in the best interests of the child." Pieper v. Pieper, 125 Idaho 667, 669,
873 P.2d 921,923 (1994)). Idaho Code section 32-717 gives a judge wide discretion regarding
9

custody decisions, subject to some restrictions, with the children's best interests being of
paramount importance. LC. § 32-717; Hoskinson v. Hosldnson, 139 Idaho 448, 455, 80 P.3d
1049, 1056 (2003). "[T]he determination of whether to modify child custody is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not attempt to substitute its judgment and
discretion for that of the trial court except in cases where the record reflects a clear abuse of
discretion." Levin v. Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 586, 836 P.2d 529, 532 (1992).
In reviewing an exercise of discretion, this Court must consider: "(l) whether the trial
court con-ectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise
ofreason." Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223,226,254 P.3d 1219, 1222 (2011).
Thus, the issue is whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate's conclusion that changing physical custody was in the children's best interests. Doe v.
Doe, 149 Idaho 669,671,239 P.3d 774, 776 (2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the
evidence is insufficient to support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and welfare of the
children would be best served by a particular custody award or modification. McGriff v. McGrijf,
140 Idaho 642, 645, 99 P.3d 11 I, 114 (2004). Appellate courts, however, are not pe1mitted to
substitute their own view of the evidence for that of the trial comt, or to make credibility
dete1minations. Id.
In this matter, the Father alleged a material, permanent and substantial change of
circumstances occun-ed warranting a modification of prior orders which consisted of I:
significantly reduced income of the Father and 2: another relocation of the Mother and minor
child.
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The Magistrate Court concluded that these allegations were shown through the evidence
and that "a material, permanent and substantial change of circumstances since the Court's last
order in this case in April of 2013 because M has moved from Virginia to Idaho, M plans to
move back to Virginia in August of 2017, F has lost his job in the oil fields and earns about a
third or twenty-five percent of what he earned there, and M has a history and pattern of moving
B often and calls into question the stability ofB while in M's care and custody." R. p. 131. Each
of these findings was supp01ted by evidence presented in this matter and reasonable conclusions
from that evidence. These factors also are more than sufficient to show a material, permanent
and substantial change of circumstances.
I. Mother has moved from Virginia to Idaho.
There is clearly no question that this fact was shown in the record at trial. Mother
testified as to her current address in Meridian, Idaho (Tr. p. 38) and that she had moved in 2014
from Virginia. (Tr. p. 29) This fact is material, permanent and substantial change of circumstance
as the minor child was no longer living across the country. The relocation would allow for the
real ability of the Father to have additional and extended visitation. This fact alone would be
sufficient to warrant a change in the custody and visitation order.
2. Mother plans to move back to Virginia and Mother has a history and pattern of moving
B often and call into question the stability ofB while in Mother's care and custody.
Mother testified as to her desire to move back to Virginia (Tr. p. 36) and as to the
instability in her daughter's life by the child being in five (5) different schools while the child is
only 10 (Tr. p. 33-34) and that she had moved five (5) times since the birth of her child. (Tr. p.
31) This fact is also shown in the various counties this case has traveled to: Ada, Canyon,
Bonneville and Bingham.
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In Poesy v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258,561 P.2d 400 (1977), this Court explained:
While the material, pennanent and snhstantial change
standard is a sound legal principle, care must be exercised in its
application. The tendency is to search for some greatly altered
circumstance in an attempt to pinpoint the change called for by the
rule. Thus, the emphasis is placed on defining some change, and
making that change appear, in itself, to be material, permanent and
substantial. This focus is misleading. The important portion of the
standard is that which relates the change in conditions to the best
interest of the child. The changed circumstance standard was
designed, as a matter of policy, to prevent continuous re-litigation
of custody matters. That policy goal, however, is of secondary
importance when compared to the best interest of the child, which
is the controlling consideration in all custody proceedings. The
court must look not only for changes of condition or circumstance
which are material, permanent and substantial, but also must
thoroughly explore the ramifications, vis-a -vis the best interest of
the child, of any change which is evident. What may appear by
itself to be a small and insignificant change in circumstances may
have significant effects insofar as children are concerned.
Care must also be taken to avoid 'compartmentalizing'
consideration of a child's best interest in successive attempts at
custody modification. The best interest of a child, like its growth,
is a matter of development. An emerging pattern which is not
apparent in a first consideration may come into focus at some later
time. The court should allow and consider all evidence relevant to
a child's interest, not just that evidence which has emerged since
previous orders. Id. at 261-62, 403-04 (internal citations omitted).

This Court has made it clear that whether a change in conditions is "material" or
"substantial" depends upon the impact of the change on the children. Evans, 151 Idaho at 226,
254 P.3d at 1222.
The Magistrate Court noted the recent moves of the Mother and the number of schools
that B.G.S. had attended in the past year. Additionally, the Magistrate Court had the testimony
noted above about the number and times of relocation. The Magistrate Court also noted the
procedural history of this case and the previous order which initially allowed the move to
Virginia and set out a custody and visitation schedule to accommodate that relocation. Tr. p. 129.
12

After these findings, the Magistrate Court then, in its discretion, found that it would be in the
best interests for B.G.S. to remain in Shelly with Father to provide more stability.

It is clear that the Magistrate Court's decision finding the relocation back to Idaho and
the history and pattern of relocating was a material, permanent and substantial change in
circumstances when applied to the best interests of B.G.S. Five schools in five years and five
moves in ten years would appear to be well within the discretion of the Court to make this
determination.
3. Father has lost his job in the oil fields and earns about a third or twenty-five percent of
what he earned there.
The Magistrate Court had substantial, factual basis for this determination based on the
stipulation of the patties as to their incomes (Tr. p. 22) and the testimony presented in the trial.
(Tr. p. 44) The prior Order of the Court had Father's income at $78,000 (Tr. p. 84) and Father
testified that he had additional income from overtime in addition to the base. (Tr. p. 43) At the
time of trial, Father's income was found to be $45,000. (Tr. p. 130)
This reduction in income is not only a material, permanent and substantial change in
circumstances when applied to child support calculations, but also in Father's ability to travel to
conduct visitation. Father testified that for each visitation he would have to pay between
$1,000.00 to $1,500.00 per trip. (Tr. p. 46) His significant reduction in income impacted not only
his ability to pay child suppmt but also his ability to have his ordered visitation.
The Magistrate Court properly found that the reduction in Father's income was a
material, pe1manent and substantial change in circumstances for both child support and
visitation.
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The Mother's reliance on the cases of Doe v. Doe, 161 Idaho 67,383 P.3d 1237 (2016)
and Evans v. Slayer, 151 Idaho 223, 254 P.3d 1219 (2011) is misplaced and not relevant to the
facts in this matter.
In Doe, the issue before that magistrate and the Court on appeal stemmed from the
allegation of alienation of the children by the mother. This Court examined the facts and
allegations in the record before it and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support
the alienation claim. This had nothing to do with the move, as the move was only the topic upon
which the alleged alienation conversations and actions occuned.

In this case, the Magistrate Coutt's dete1minations are all based on established facts and
are supported by the record herein. Each of these findings has been detailed above. The
Magistrate Court's determinations are well within its discretion.
In Evans, this Court upheld a determination of a magistrate finding a mother's decision to
not attend college was not a material, permanent and substantial change in circumstances. This
Court noted that the mother could again change her mind at any time to go to school and that her
actions seemed to be exhibiting buyer's remorse for agreeing to the prior order. The focus of this
Court and the magistrate was on the impact and change this determination had on the children.
In this matter, the Magistrate Court also based his finding of a material, pe1manent and
substantial change in circumstances on the impact on the child by the parties' actions. This
Magistrate Court examined the impact moving had on B.G.S. 's stability, and the testimony
presented at trial that Mother was again moving, to detennine that the additional relocations had
a material, permanent and substantial change in circumstances on the child. The Magistrate
Court did exactly what this Court says it is supposed to do in Evans. Additionally, the Magistrate
Court was not only focused on the relocations, but on all the factors from trial.
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On reconsideration, the Mother attempted to execute the same change in position as the
mother in Evans, by stating that she was no longer going to move to Virginia. The Magistrate
Court in this case conducted a proper analysis of the reconsideration motion and denied the
same.
The Magistrate Court properly found a material, pe1manent and substantial change in
circumstances to modify the prior orders in this matter for custody and child support. Each of the
items listed by the Magistrate Court as a factor for this finding was based on substantial evidence
and a reasonable interpretation of that evidence.
II.

DID THE MAGISTRATE ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST

INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILD TO CHANGE PRIMARY CUSTODY IN ITS
JANUARY 6, 2017 DECISION AND REAFFIRMING THAT DECISION IN ITS ORDER
RE MOTION TO RECONSIDER?
The Mother next argues that the Magistrate Court erred in changing primary custody to
the Father. This is incorrect. The Magistrate Court properly examined the facts of the case,
applied correct, relevant law, and acted within the reasonable bounds of discretion.
The Mother's arguments in this matter center around the case of Lamont v. Lamont, 158
Idaho 353, 347 P.3d 645 (2015). Mother would have this Court believe that Lamont stands for
the few factual issues presented in her briefing, ie better income potential after moving,
educational needs, and relationship with the other parent. In fact, Lamont did not address any of
these items, nor place any weight on these or any other factors. The Court in Lamont merely
listed several of the numerous items the magistrate court in that case considered in making its
dete1mination. The Court then went on to note all the various legal standards governing the
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exercise of discretion for a court to make a determination of relocation and primary custody.
Mother's reliance on any individual factual statements is misplaced and inappropriate.
In this matter, the Magistrate Court noted that the deteimination of primary custody was
based on the discretion of the court. It listed the relevant facts from the testimony of the parties
and then noted the legal standards, questions and analysis to be performed in exercising its
discretion. The Magistrate Comt listed and analyzed each of the listed factors of LC. §32- 717
with the facts presented during the trial. Each of these findings is soundly based on the facts
presented at trial. The conclusion of the Magistrate Comt was reached with a decision within the
legal requirements and the facts presented to the Court. The Magistrate Court dete1mined that it
would be in the best interests ofB.G.S. to have Father exercise primary custody and Mother
receive visitation. The Magistrate Court determined that Father was the parent in the best
position to meet the needs ofB.G.S. and provide her with a stable home.
The Magistrate Court likewise utilized the same process and examination of the facts and
applicable law in its determination on the Motion to Reconsider. The Magistrate Court noted that
a determination of a reconsideration was within its discretion. The Magistrate Court examined
the facts and arguments from both the reconsideration and trial and applied them to the
discretionary standard. The Order from the reconsideration was well within the discretion of the
Magistrate Court.
Mother also seeks to isolate each and every finding from the Magistrate Court and claim
each is insufficient to wairnnt a change in custody. This argument, however, is not the standard.
It is not necessary for each and every finding of the Magistrate Court to be self-sufficient to

justify the change of custody, but rather a determination of all of the factors together. It is the
providence of the trial court to weight to the evidence and each factor and a Court on appeal will
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not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. King v. King, 137 Idaho 438, 442, 50
P.3d 453, 457 (2002).
The determinations by the Magistrate Court were made based on facts, applicable law
and reasonable discretion. The fact that the Magistrate Court did not view the facts the same way
as the Mother wishes them to be viewed is not an abuse of discretion.

III.

DID THE MAGISTRATE ERR IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACTS IN ITS JANUARY
6, 2017 DECISION AND IN ITS ORDER RE MOTION TO RECONSIDER?
Mother's final arguments claim the Magistrate Court did not provide sufficient findings

of fact. This is incorrect and completely misstates the Memorandwn Decision and Order.
In the Court's Memorandwn Decision and Order, the court included a "Findings of Fact"
section. In this section, the Magistrate Court stated the facts that were testified to by each party
that he had accepted. It is clear from the Transcript of the hearing that not everything presented
by each witness was included in this "Findings of Fact" determination by the Magistrate Court.
Each of the findings of the Magistrate Court is consistent with the testimony of the patties. In
this way, each is based on substantial and competent evidence.
"This Court limits its review of a trial court's decision to determining 'whether the
evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions
oflaw.' "City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 434-35, 299 P.3d 232, 241-42 (2013)
(quoting Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903,907,204 P.3d 1114, 1118 (2009)). "Unless the trial
court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, they will not be set aside." Id. at 435, 299 P.3d at
242. "A district court's findings of fact in a court-tried case are constrned liberally on appeal in
favor of the judgment entered." Elec. Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814,820,
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41 P.3d 242, 248 (2001). "It is the province of the trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and
testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Id.
Here, the Magistrate Court heard the testimony of the parties, examined their credibility
and even engaged in questioning of the witnesses. The Magistrate Court then set out the relevant
testimony from each witness as its findings of fact for this case. This is precisely the appropriate
procedure. It appears that the Mother would require the Magistrate Court to make each statement

in its "Findings of Fact" and then conclude the statement with "and the Court finds it so."
Mother additionally argues that the Magistrate Court's detenninations in the Order re
Motion for Reconsideration were without factual basis. Each is discussed below.
1. Appellant has not made any serious attempts to foster a good relationship between Father
andB.G.S.
The Magistrate Court noted this was based on the testimony surrounding Mother not being
willing to work with Father for additional time after the move back to Idaho. This is factually
supported by the testimony at trial. Tr. pp. 69-71
2. Mother is insensitive to the need of Father and B.G.S. to have a good relationship.
The Magistrate Court's full statement on this matter is "M's trial testimony that she was
moving to Virginia to further her career and then M's affidavits at the Motion to Reconsider that
M was not moving to Virginia ifM couldn't take B with her could mean that Mis a dedicated
parent to B or it could mean that Mis insensitive to the need for F and B to have a reasonably
good parent child relationship." This is clear that the factual basis for this determination is the
testimony of Mother that she was going to move and then, after the Decision in this matter that
she was not going to move. Both of these statements are factually based. The Magistrate Comt
was noting the possible implications of the change in testimony by the Mother. Mother testified
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that she would move to Virginia if B.G.S. were to remain in Shelly, Idaho (Tr. p. 116), and she
would move as soon as B.G.S. turned 18 if she were to remain in the Boise area.(Tr. p. 115)
3. Father will make Mother's and B.G.S. 's relationship a priority.
This determination by the Magistrate Court is based on the trial testimony of Father. Father
testified that he would work to ensure B.G.S. was able to consistently see her mother, (Tr. p. 48)
and that Mother could be involved (Tr. p. 51 ).
Each of the alleged improper factual determination alleged by the Father were in fact
based on reliable and substantial evidence from the trial. Again, just because the Magistrate
Court does not see the facts the way the Mother wants does not mean they are wrong.

CONCLUSION
Mother's appeal of this matter is without basis and any legitimate legal argument. Mother
is simply unhappy with the determination of the Magistrate Comt and seeks this Court to
substitute its opinions and factual determinations for the trial court. Each of the Magistrate
Court's findings is based on substantial evidence, reasonable inferences, and a proper exercise of
the trial court's discretion. The appeal should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this \1-~day of August, 2017.

Lanen K. Covert, Esq.
Of Swafford Law, PC
Attorney for the Father
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day I caused to be served a trne and correct copy of the
foregoing document on the parties designated below and by the method of delivery indicated:

Tracy W. Gonnan
428 Park Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Dated this

1$-MAILING
oFAXING
o HAND DELIVERY
o COURTHOUSE BOX

1"day of August, 2017.

l 1--

Larren K. Covert, Esq.
Of Swafford Law, PC
Attorney for the Father
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